

AD/ISA via Hsu  
117 JUL 1962  
SC-07010

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Preliminary Comment on Church Door Mission  
No. 119 of [REDACTED] 25X1A

1. The results of this mission do not in any way change the most recent estimate of Chinese Communist intentions nor does it change the most recent Watch Committee conclusions. No definitive evidence that the Chinese Communists are planning to initiate hostilities against the Offshore Islands was disclosed.

2. No large scale troop concentrations were noted in the areas covered and the junk and sampan count where observed does not seem to be unusually large. In fact, the count of 550 junks and sampans in the Amoy area may be below normal--as many as 800 to 900 have been reported previously from other sources as a normal concentration in this area.

3. This mission reports a barracks area in the Anhui area northeast of Amoy. From the coordinates given, this area does not appear to be the same as any of those covered in the Bow Tie Mission 114 of 4 July which disclosed 200 barracks in several locations farther to the west and southwest of Anhui. The number of barracks reported in the Anhui area is 146. There is no indication that this is new construction and no description of their size but if they are of the same dimension as those reported in adjacent areas in the 4 July Bow Tie Mission, they could probably house at least one division or about 15,000 troops. Anhui is located on an inlet about 15 miles north of Chinmen and could serve as a staging area for an amphibious assault on the island using shallow draft vessels.

4. Truck activity in the Chingyang area, northeast of Amoy was reported as considerable but only small groups of vehicles were involved with no large convoys reported. This could reflect activity by military units in place. Northwest of Foochow a 236 truck convoy was observed proceeding toward Foochow. While it is impossible to determine the type of unit involved the number of vehicles suggest a regimental size unit. An infantry division has about 530 vehicles assigned to it.

5. Rail-line disruption in the Amoy area was noted and one part of the rail-line from Amoy to Lungchi appears to be

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
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abandoned. The rail-line from Yungan to Amoy was covered and appears to be serviceable but no repairs or maintenance work was observed and apparently no rail traffic was observed. It would seem that much more activity would have been noted on this key rail line if heavy military preparations were currently underway. It is possible that the lack of activity reflects the completion of troop deployments noted earlier in communications intelligence.

6. Rail traffic noted farther north in the Shunchang area does not appear to indicate heavy military movement. Of the several small trains noted in the area, only one, a 15 car passenger train with two flat cars loaded with vehicles, appears to have been a troop train.

7. The photo mission indicates that the Chinese Communist have improved their air defense capabilities in the Taiwan Strait area. For example, identification of 13 MIG-15/17 jet fighters at Chungan airfield provides the first firm evidence that this field has become operational as a fighter base. Recent communications intelligence has reflected some CCAF transport activity at Chungan, indicating the possible move of an air unit to the field.

8. In addition, the mission confirmed the reactivation and recent deployment of jet fighters to Shuikou airfield near Huiyang in the Canton area. Communications intelligence reflected the flight, in stages, of at least 46 jet fighters from the Kirin area of Northeast China to Shuikou between 14 and 24 June 1962.

9. Eight MIG-17 fighters on Chingyang airfield is the highest number noted to date; three MIGs were detected in photo intelligence on [REDACTED] Chingyang has been used periodically as a recovery base for fighters operating over the Taiwan Strait from other fields. No CCAF unit is based at Chingyang; however, fighters from bases farther inland may now be using Chingyang for strip alerts.

10. Information on the remainder of the airfields confirms previous CCAF AOB (see attachment).

Dist: DCI  
DDI  
DDR  
AD/CI  
AD/RR  
AD/BI  
DIR/MPIC  
AD/OEA via room 6B-12 - 2 -  
FK/DRP (Magill)  
LS/PAD (MPIC)  
SLO/OCI  
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IMMEDIATE PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION REPORT. GNC-119.  
DATE OF INFORMATION [REDACTED]

25X1D

Airfield (Coord.)	Aircraft	SIGINT AOB	PI
1. CHING-YANG 24-48N/118-35E	8 Fresco	None	3 MIG (6/27/62) 0 (7/2/62)
2. CHUNG AN 27-41N/117-59E	13 Fagot/Fresco (transport and 3 pos Acft. activity)		
3. FU CHOU/NAN TAI 26-00N/119-19E	26 Fagot/Fresco and 1, Cab.	Regt. of 3rd AD (32)	26 MIG-17 (7/3/62)
4. HSIN-CHENG 25-33N/114-37E	15 Prob Fagot/ Fresco	Regt. of 4th AD & 2nd Ind. Regt.	
5. HSING-NING 24-09N/115-45E (Approx 100 bldgs in afd area)	13 Fresco and 4 Fagot	Elements of 18th and 9 th ADs (20)	
6. HUI-AV 25-01N/114-48E	None	None	0 (7/3/62)
7. KAO CHI 24-32N/11-80E	None	None	
8. LUNG CHI 24-33N/117-39E	20 Fagot/Fresco	22nd AD	23 MIG (7/2/62) 18 MIG (7/4/62)
9. LUNG-TIEN 25-34N/119-27E	22 Fagot/Fresco	Regt. of 3rd AD	16 MIG (7/5/62)
10. MA CHIANG 24-40N/118-16E	None	None	0
11. NAN CHANG 28-38N/115-56E (Haze and Obliquity Preclude Interpretation)	None	24th AD	Hsiangtang 21 MIG 15/17 (6/30/62) Hsiangtang 49 (6/29/62) Changshu 12 MIG 15/17 (6/29/62)
12. SHUI KOU 23-03N/114-36E	32 Fagot/Fresco	Recently deployed AD (Sigint or move to advt.)	
13. SWATH-NORTHEAST 23-26N/116-45E (Heavy Clouds covering Airfield)	None		0 (6/24/62) 0 (7/5/62)

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